The Yes of Nietzsche and Hegel in Altizer by Hass, Andrew
Accepted for publication in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory: 
https://jcrt.org/archives/19.1/Hass.pdf  
 
1 
 
The Yes of Nietzsche and Hegel in Altizer 
Andrew W. Hass 
University of Stirling 
 
 
Thomas J. J. Altizer read both Hegel and Nietzsche as he read all thinkers he enlisted with a canonical 
routine: as theologians. This is not to say he confused their agenda and their task. Hegel remained 
the philosopher of philosophers, Nietzsche the master of all suspicious masters, a poet-philosopher 
with critique as his hammer. But their thinking was to be understood, in Altizer’s view, principally as 
theological thinking, which is to say, whatever else we may think theology is in today’s world, it 
cannot be thought without Hegel and Nietzsche. And this is because, as Altizer would audaciously 
write, these two figures “met the modern crisis of theology by recreating theology itself”.1 In what 
follows I want to work out what this re-creation looks like for Altizer, and how, under his reading, 
such an odd pairing, Hegel and Nietzsche, become more than partners in the process:  they become, 
as Altizer would say emphatically, in “full union” with one another.2 
It is insufficient to say that Hegel and Nietzsche were major influences on Altizer’s theological 
enterprise, even profound influences. Both figures did more than persuade, more than redirect 
thought in its current state. They inaugurated something new, wholly new, and not just in their own 
day, against their own traditions of thinking, but more significantly within Altizer himself. These are 
two figures whose intentions go well beyond nuanced change or refinement, or nudging given ideas 
along a slightly altered path, and reach instead wholesale destruction and reinvention. Altizer was 
never one for subtleties and qualifications of argument. The conditional rarely figures in his prose or 
his thinking – “one might see in this…”, “it could be argued that…”, “perhaps we might consider…”. 
His statements were of an absolute character, often accompanied with superlatives – “our greatest”, 
“our deepest”, “the ultimate”, “totally”, “nothing shows this more than”, “and absolutely so”. 
Altizer’s yes was yes, and his no was no. If there was something in between, it was in the form of the 
interrogative, with the assumption that the answer could only be found on the poles of these 
extremes, even if simultaneously. Thus when he discovered Hegel and Nietzsche, two figures who 
could say yes and no at the same time, he felt the absolute presence of something genuinely new, a 
rebirth, by which the old could no longer remain. No other philosophical thinkers had this power or 
this effect for Altizer; they could only work in the wake left by these two radicals (as in the case of 
                                                          
1 Thomas J. J. Altizer, “Letter 67: To Friends (June 7, 2013)”, in This Silence Must Now Speak: Letters of Thomas 
J. J. Altizer, 1995-2015 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 227. 
2 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Living the Death of God: A Theological Memoir (Albany: State University of New York, 
2006), p. 19.  
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Kierkegaard, say, or Heidegger). Hegel and Nietzsche were, completely and uncompromisingly, new 
points of departure. 
Now if Nietzsche seems the more natural candidate for this kind of revolutionary role, as he wields 
his sledgehammer and ignites his dynamite, and if Hegel seems to be more manipulated in this 
regard, being the arch systematician that he was, we need to keep in mind one crucial fact: of 
Altizer’s life-changing encounters with both figures, it was Nietzsche who came first. If Hegel’s 
thought provided more philosophical substance to Altizer’s theological endeavors, it was only 
through the lens of Nietzsche that this substance could induce its power. Thus, in a move that, I am 
confident, would find support from Altizer himself, I will lay aside the conventions of chronology and 
examine Nietzsche first. 
Altizer’s Nietzsche 
Nihilation, dissolution, reversal, re-creation – these are the hallmarks of Nietzsche’s passion. When 
Altizer first discovered this passion, it was, he tells us in his theological memoir, within the context of 
his Masters degree at the University of Chicago’s Divinity School in the early 1950s.3 While writing 
his thesis on nature and grace in Augustine, he was simultaneously immersed in the writings of 
Nietzsche, which began a long-term project of correlating these two unlikely thinkers. If Augustine 
was responsible for modern subjectivity as we know it – the self as the center of consciousness – it 
was Nietzsche who “decisively discovered the dissolution of that subject”.4 Rather than ending 
modernity’s stuttering theological journey once and for all, Altizer’s Nietzsche reunited philosophical 
and theological thinking. But such reunification was not a regressive step back to a pre-modern, or 
even Augustinian, unity, even if Nietzsche’s thought was implicitly reliant upon Augustine. A 
different kind of unity was inaugurated, one that could now hold together extreme poles in a 
coincidentia oppositorum. For just as Augustine could see grace at work in his own sinful nature, so 
Nietzsche could see a Yes at work in the profoundest of Nos. Of course that No only Nietzsche had 
the temerity to articulate in unequivocal and stentorian tones – the No of God, the No that is God’s 
death. That No was unmistakably theological, but it was also inextricably philosophical, as God lay 
sacrificed upon the stony altars of all Western philosophy since Socrates, as Christianised with 
determination by Augustine. 
This Nietzschean unity of Yes and No manifested itself in a deeply personal way for Altizer, and led 
him down a Damascene road, where 
                                                          
3 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
4 Ibid., p. 7. 
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in June of 1955, while reading Erich Heller’s essay on Nietzsche and Rilke for the 
seventh time in a library at the University of Chicago, I had what I have ever since 
regarded as a genuine religious conversion, and this was a conversion to the death 
of God. For then I truly experienced the death of God, and experienced it as a 
conversion, and thus as the act and grace of God himself.5  
Now to be converted to the death of God, and to call this conversion not merely religious but an act 
and grace of God, quite obviously defies conventional theological understanding (Christian or 
otherwise). But it also defies logical consistency. For how can anything act, much less offer grace, 
when it is no longer? Altizer’s conversion is to this very contradiction, one that resides in a deep 
pathos that Nietzsche sees in both philosophy and religion. Very early in Nietzsche’s career, during 
the same year that he published his first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), the young Nietzsche was 
exploring intensely the relationship between truth and pathos, particularly as the Greeks had 
understood it. He wrote with an early aphoristic tone: “Curious problem: the self-consumption of 
philosophical systems! This is equally unheard of in science and in art. Religion, however, is similar to 
philosophy in this respect: this is remarkable and significant.”6 This self-consumption can be seen in 
Altizer’s way of rendering his conversion experience, which, in terms of pathos, he understood as 
“the very reversal of my experience with Satan”, whose epiphany he had described a few pages 
earlier as “Satan consuming me, absorbing me into his very being… the deepest and yet most 
horrible union”.7 This union he would extend to Satan and Christ as the deepest theological 
coincidentia oppositorum he would thereafter seek. If the reversal of this Satanic consumption is in 
fact the “pure grace” of experiencing the death of God, we can understand how Nietzsche informs – 
indeed consumes – the very core of Altizer’s theological sensibility and passion, which is no less 
theological for that consumption, and all the more “truthful”. “If you want to achieve peace of mind 
and happiness, then have faith”, wrote a 21-year-old Nietzsche to his sister Elizabeth, but “if you 
want to be a disciple of truth, then search.”8 
All conversion involves a turning, indeed a reversal, so to reverse Christian conversion itself, while 
remaining true to the Christian pathos that inspires conversion, requires Nietzsche, and what 
Nietzsche called dysangel, the opposite of “evangel”. As he describes it in The Antichrist (§39), “the 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 8. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge”, in 
Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, ed. and trans. Daniel 
Breazeale (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1979), p. 19. 
7 Altizer, Living the Death of God, pp. 4-5. 
8 Letter to Elizabeth Nietzsche, 11 June 1865, as quoted in Sue Prideaux, I Am Dynamite!: A Life of Friedrich 
Nietzsche (London: Faber and Faber, 2018), p. 43. 
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‘evangel’ died on the cross. What has been called ‘evangel’ from that moment was actually the 
opposite of that which he had lived: ‘ill tidings’, a dysangel.”9 The passion of Christ becomes a unique 
reversal, therefore, of the history of Christianity, even before that history could unfold, so that any 
return to a genuine Christianity must take on the dysangelical reality of Christ’s passion as death. 
Nietzsche was the first to issue a clarion call as dsyangelist – the “euthanasia of Christianity”.10 
Altizer is converted to this call as the necessary reversal of conversion itself: one is not converted to 
God, but to God’s death, which for Altizer is a “good death” not because it redeems the converted, 
nor, as it was for the Nietzsche of Daybreak, because God happily elides himself in a moralism, but 
because it reverses the news, the angel, by which the converted is impassioned to act, a passion 
which of course Nietzsche had elsewhere called Dionysian, but which Altizer, following Blake, 
associates with Satan, so that the fallen angel and the redeemer Christ can become one.11 In this 
sense it is now “Dionysus and the Crucified”.  
This reversal, whereby euangelos is converted to euthanatos, transfers the creativity of Dionysian 
impulse to the Crucified. To understand that transference, we need, perhaps paradoxically, to 
understand Altizer’s reading of Nietzsche’s sense of life. When Nietzsche affirms life, and affirms it in 
contradistinction to what Christianity had become – a moral set of values underwritten by the 
metaphysics of a transcendent God designed specifically for the weak – he affirms something that is 
instinctual, in the moment, immediately active, and always in deed. When Goethe’s Faust famously 
re-fabulates the Gospel of John’s creation story, itself already a theological re-fabulation of the first 
creation story in Genesis, he alters what was “in the beginning” from the Word (Wort) to the Mind 
(Sinn), and then to the Force (Kraft), and finally to the Act (Tat).12 For Nietzsche, Goethe and indeed 
his Faust represented a true free spirit, a character of noble strength, one that no longer negates, 
but, out of the sheer power of the artist’s poesis and the experimenter’s will, brings into existence 
with the defiant Yes of enactment. “And should I not with utmost yearning seek / To bring to life 
                                                          
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Antichrist”, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 1982), p. 612. 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), Book I, §92, p. 54.  
11 Bruce Ellis Benson points out Nietzsche’s claim, as issued through the voice of Zarathustra, that “when gods 
die, they always die several kinds of death” (Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith [Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2008], p. 27; quoting Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, IV, “Retired from Service”). 
We might add, following Altizer, they die several kinds of good deaths. 
12 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: Part One and Sections from Part Two, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 52-53. 
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that creature most unique?”, quotes Nietzsche from Faust in his “Attempt at Self-Criticism” to The 
Birth of Tragedy, that inaugural book where the Dionysian spirit first unfolded its wings.13  
Altizer works out the question of beginning and creation in the most sustained manner within his 
1993 book The Genesis of God: A Theological Genealogy. Nietzsche had figured in Altizer’s earlier 
texts as the one who presents the reversal or self-negation of Christianity, as voiced especially by 
Zarathustra, or later by Nietzsche as the Antichrist. This reversal is possible only upon Nietzsche’s 
discovery, as Altizer put it in History and Apocalypse (1985), of “the archaic and primordial ground of 
the individuality and interiority of consciousness itself”, a ground upon which consciousness, in 
Hegelian fashion, negates itself.14 In The Genesis of God, rooted in the thick forest of Altizer’s mature 
work, Nietzsche comes into his own as a creative force, especially in relation to Hegel (of which more 
below). The book’s title already shows the circular nature of creative power, as it oscillates between 
destruction and creation, for the title’s cogenitive structure, in which the genitive construction 
should be read both subjectively and objectively, indicates both the genesis that is effected by God 
and the genesis that effects God. The “theological genealogy” of the subtitle will reveal both sides as 
necessary to each other. 
In a discussion on actuality that begins with Spinoza in the fourth chapter entitled “The Necessity of 
God”, by which God is actualized only within the immanence that is nature, so that both nature and 
God become co-extensive, and infinitely co-extensive, Altizer is able to aver God’s necessity as an 
absolute necessity actualized in the world, which he calls the very embodiment of God. So when 
Nietzsche proclaims the death of God, he does so, for Altizer, with the full knowledge that this death 
is predicated upon a consciousness of this actuality, as much as an actuality of this consciousness, so 
that God is both dead to this world as a transcendent Being, and, through absolute kenosis, fully 
actualized as this death, in all the potency of this actualization. But a conscious actualizing of death 
is, technically, impossible, for as Blanchot has taught us, the instant of death is something one can 
never experience.15 And yet it is precisely this “impossible necessary death”, where, as Derrida 
describes it, “impossibility and necessity both reciprocally refer to and co-implicate each other, both 
[are] subject and attribute each to the other abidingly [à demeure]”, that Altizer picks up in the 
                                                          
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Shaun Whiteside, ed. Michael Tanner (London: Penguin, 
1993), p. 11. 
14 Thomas J. J. Altizer, History and Apocalypse (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 227. 
15 See Maurice Blanchot, The Instant of My Death, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000). The last lines of the short main story read “‘I am alive. No, you are dead’” (p. 9), before the final 
line of the postscript: “the instant of my death henceforth always in abeyance” (p. 11). 
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name of Nietzsche, in whose genealogy genesis and God, birth and death, reciprocally refer to and 
co-implicate each other.16 Thus Altizer will state:  
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God can be understood as a 
reenactment or renewal of a unique and absolute beginning, and it is precisely as 
such that it has wiped away our whole horizon. And the disappearance is not and 
cannot be an eternally repeated disappearance, but a once-and-for-all 
disappearance, and Nietzsche himself could understand it as the most important 
event in history.17  
This is also to say that disappearance and beginning are likewise co-implicated in each other. What 
has been rent from us consequently demands a new beginning, a new organon as Bacon would call 
it, one that now perpetuates itself from a moment wholly within time and space, and no longer from 
a pre-temporal eternity. As Altizer quotes from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (III, “The Convalescent”), 
“Being begins in every now.”18 This beginning in every now, which starts anew as actualization, is, for 
Altizer, Nietzsche’s sense of life – “not the eternal now of transcendent Godhead, but an immediate 
and actual now, and a totally actual now”, which the late Nietzsche could know as a Godhead, but a 
Godhead of absolute immanence to which he would attach the name Dionysus.19  
Now if this “actual now” is for Nietzsche life, the life that reinvigorates our grievous sense of loss and 
guilt in the shadow of God’s disappearance in death, the existential life that no longer depends upon 
a reflective consciousness to shore up the transcendental edifices of our being (or Being), then this is 
a life that asserts itself, that wills itself, into the now of actuality through creation. And this is why 
Nietzsche, as much as Altizer, returns consistently to the artist (the poet, the musician, the novelist, 
the painter), in what Heidegger will call “the will to power as art”.20 But the abiding question for this 
life is how to sustain the actual now in this creation. If actuality must reside in the now alone, which 
is constantly fleeting, constantly giving itself over to its opposite (as past or future), how can it 
maintain itself? 
                                                          
16 Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), p. 47. The phrase “impossible necessary death” is Blanchot’s from The Writing of the Disaster, 
trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986, 1995), p. 67. 
17 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Genesis of God: A Theological Genealogy (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1993), p. 76. 
18 Ibid., p. 77. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche – Vol. 1, The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1979), pp. 1-220. 
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For Nietzsche, the answer was in his concept, or his doctrine, or what Altizer will call his “vision”, of 
Eternal Recurrence. The meaning of this doctrine is notoriously elusive, but it is no accident that 
Heidegger in his Nietzsche lectures of the second half of the 1930s followed the first lecture, “The 
Will to Power as Art”, with a second lecture entitled “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same”, even if 
Heidegger goes on to read the latter doctrine as a Nietzschean form of metaphysics. For Altizer, the 
idea is the basis not of a metaphysics but of a reversed “holiness”. For if the idea of the holy is to be 
set apart, the holiness of the Christian God, as it developed within the history of Christianity, had set 
God apart from life. This, for Altizer, is the basis of Nietzsche’s understanding of ressentiment. To 
reverse this ressentiment, to reverse the flight from life, Nietzsche introduces Eternal Recurrence as 
that which engenders anew in the actual now of life, immediately and repeatedly and eternally, and 
does so in a totality that reverses all holiness as separation, as departure, as distance. This totality – 
“total presence”, Altizer’s theological reconstitution of “real presence” – totalizes beginning and 
ending in a single but forever ongoing act of creation, and thus “gives witness to the original and 
absolute act of creation”, so that “Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recurrence is a visionary enactment 
of an absolute act and actuality, an actuality that is the very act of creation itself.”21 
For Altizer this creative vision is also an apocalyptic vision because every “now” requires a radically, 
irreversibly new beginning, which is as much an ending, so that origination and negation become 
one. This is why, throughout all of Altizer’s work, genesis and apocalypse are always coupled, always 
and inevitably in a coincidentia oppositorum.22 Altizer’s reading of Eternal Recurrence keeps these 
two sides in an absolute embrace, a dance of perpetual origination, in which what is recurring is not 
an eternity that is primordial and eternally only itself, but a new eternity, one that, oxymoronically, 
begins anew. So when Altizer appropriates the phrase “eternal recurrence”, the “eternal” is not a 
modifier of recurrence so much as it is what is being modified as recurrence. That is, a recurring 
eternity, wholly and absolute new, a consequence of the apocalyptic death of the old primordial 
eternity of premodernity. This is why Altizer seldom adds “the same” to the phrase as it appears in 
the original Nietzschean idea. For what is “same” can only be utterly new; but it is precisely in the 
same actualization of a new beginning that eternity can remain new, and that life can remain life. It 
is this recurring eternity which Altizer sees as Nietzsche’s new Godhead, born anew in genesis, but 
only on the death of apocalypse.23 
                                                          
21 Altizer, The Genesis of God, p. 81. 
22 See, for example Genesis and Apocalypse: A Theological Voyage Towards Authentic Christianity (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), pp. 36-40. 
23 Heidegger, even in his reading of Eternal Recurrence as the “accomplishment” of metaphysics, “the most 
profound gathering” of all that is Western metaphysics since Plato towards what is a fatal “counterposition”, 
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But here it is imperative that we understand one crucial distinction: Eternal Recurrence is not 
synonymous with Eternal Return. This is a pitfall most commentators make in coming to terms with 
Nietzsche’s circulus vitiosus. If a primordial eternity, as just discussed, takes us back to a state or 
condition in which eternity transcends all actuality, leaving behind actuality, an utter holiness that is 
consummate separation, then in the understanding of time within ancient religions, this involves a 
circle, one we can call Eternal Return. For what is the end is also the beginning, but a beginning that 
is primordial rather than actual, taking us back always to that transcendent holiness or, in the case of 
Buddhism, to a state or a condition in which all time is emptied, and there is absolutely nothing on 
the horizon. This is the traditional theological understanding of death or nirvana as a portal to 
Heaven’s eternity or Sunyata. Now if, for Altizer, it was Nietzsche who reverses this circle with 
Eternal Recurrence, so that this entire ancient circle is negated in order that it can recur anew in 
actuality, rather than returning us to the primordial, it was Hegel who best understood Eternal 
Return, and who reverses that Return from within itself. But such a reversal – the reversal of that 
which is always in reversal – can only make sense through a decisive Nietzschean break with the 
ancient horizon (either of holiness or of emptiness). And it is in this sense that Altizer reads Hegel 
through Nietzsche. So we can now turn to Hegel, in a kind of reverse order from where we started, 
to see how Eternal Return is subsumed by Eternal Recurrence, and how Hegel is in many respects a 
harbinger of Nietzsche, only to become himself Nietzschean. 
 
Altizer’s Hegel 
Altizer tells us he came to Hegel only after years of a resistance fueled by Kierkegaard. In a study on 
the poet William Blake published in 1967, The New Apocalypse: The Radical Vision of William Blake, 
he first deployed Hegel’s dialectical thinking “as a guide to the dialectical ground and meaning of 
Blake’s vision”, claiming that Hegel’s system “is a far more effective guide to Blake’s visionary world 
than are the traditional forms of Christian theology and mysticism.”24 This is because that vision 
                                                          
one that amounts to the end of metaphysics, nevertheless sees that this does not equate necessarily to the 
disappearance of God. “What to common sense looks like ‘atheism’, and has to look like it,” he writes, “is at 
bottom the very opposite. In the same way, whenever matters of death and the nothing are treated, Being and 
Being alone is thought most deeply” (Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche – Vol. 2, The Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same, trans. David Farrell Krell [New York: Harper Collins, 1984)], pp. 205, 207-208. Perhaps here is an early 
platform by which one might begin to mount the claim, as many have done with later texts, of Heidegger’s 
own metaphysical allegiance in respect to Being. 
24 The New Apocalypse: The Radical Vision of William Blake (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1967; republished Aurora: The Davies Group, 2000), p. xii. This deployment is an extension of Altizer’s earlier 
deployment of Mircea Eliade’s dialectical understanding of the sacred and the profane, with the goal of 
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demands a fall of the divine into the actuality of the given world in order, not to eradicate the 
absolute world of the divine, but in fact to realize it. What Hegel’s dialectic allows is not vision of a 
pre-existing Absolute, or primordial Eternity, as we might expect from mystical revelation, but, 
through its necessary negating impulse, the creation of an absolutely new Absolute, possible only 
through an new apocalyptic overturning and eradication of the primordial Absolute, or, as Altizer 
directs it to Blake’s vision, “the universal kenotic process of Eternity passing through condemnation 
in Albion’s ‘Eternal Death’.25 
We can already see Nietzsche’s “death of God” informing Altizer’s early appropriation of Hegel here. 
For nowhere in this text does the term “sublation” (or the original German “Aufhebung”) appear. 
Dialectical thinking for Altizer is not towards a third term of higher manifestation, a “synthesis” as it 
is so often characterized (conveniently but erroneously) within general Hegelian overviews. In the 
“Eternal Death” that marks the “universal kenotic process”, death does not yield to a higher register 
of existence. For this death is eternal, unending, but now in the sense of a forever recurring death, 
and recurring anew. This is why apocalypse must accompany all dialectical thinking, for the end is 
always present, never merely overcome or sublated. But it is, paradoxically, always a new end, or a 
new apocalypse, not as a singular event in history that happens only once (say, on the cross, or at 
the Parousia), but a singular event always recurring. Thus we might say Altizer, on the strength of 
Nietzsche, recreates the Hegelian schema as an endlessly fructiparous coincidentia oppositorum.26 
It is in such a coincidentia oppositorum that the death of God as an actual reality must be 
understood. It is far too easy to take Nietzsche’s madman as the herald of a triumphant atheism, in 
which God and theology are laid to rest as philosophically untenable, culturally moribund and 
socially irrelevant. This, in Hegelian terms, would be a “bad death of God”, along the lines of Hegel’s 
“bad infinite” – an infinite that has not yet been taken up into its absolute character as a totality. But 
as we have seen, to take up God’s death in its absolute character as totality means to transform that 
reality into an ever newly created reality, an eternal Yes that is an eternal recurrence. This “true” or 
                                                          
developing a fully Christian appropriation of a coincidentia oppositorum – Thomas J. J. Altizer, Mircea Eliade 
and Dialectic of the Sacred (Louisville: Westminster Press, 1963). 
25 Altizer, New Apocalypse, p. 77. 
26 In speaking of “the ultimate theological necessity of a total Yes”, the later Altizer writes: “This is a Yes that 
Hegel comprehensively understands and enacts, but a Yes that can never be separated or isolated from an 
absolute and No, and Hegel deeply understands an absolute No in his very understanding of self-negation or 
self-emptying. Yet this is a No which not Hegel but Nietzsche profoundly understands interiorly, which is just 
why Nietzsche is absolutely necessary to Hegel and only thereby can a purely and totally dialectical thinking 
actually be meaningful and real to us. Hence full dialectical thinking is inseparable from a pure and total 
coincidentia oppositorum, a true and actual coincidentia oppositorum of an absolute Yes and an absolute No” – 
Living the Death of God, p. 87 (italics added). 
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“genuine” death is a coincidence of opposites between disappearance and beginning. Here God is 
not flushed from our experience as the culmination and end-point of an enlightened modernity, 
what a young Hegel would characterize as “reducing the sacred grove to mere timber”,27 but rather 
modernity’s very deicide creates an entirely new grove, as it were, one constituted by a disappearing 
that is simultaneously an originating and fructifying, resulting in, we might say, sacred timber, 
growth that revitalizes theology through new and abundant fruit. 
This transformation of death is already seen in Hegel’s early essay of Faith and Knowledge, from 
which the “sacred grove” quote is taken. In its famous concluding paragraphs, a distinction between 
a good and a bad infinite is already being worked out, where the good infinite becomes an “absolute 
principle”, or the negative principle of the Absolute: “Infinity is the pure nullification of the antithesis 
or of finitude; but it is at the same time also the spring of eternal movement, the spring of that 
finitude which is infinite, because it eternally nullifies itself. Out of this nothing and pure night of 
infinity, as out of the secret abyss that is its birthplace, the truth lifts itself upward.”28 But this pure 
night and abyss signify an “infinite grief”, a grief at the loss of finitude that is relinquished in the 
Absolute. Formally, says Hegel, this grief took the form within historical and cultural processes of a 
feeling that “God Himself is dead”, a feeling found even within modern religious sentiment, when 
the longing of finite subjectivity stands in a barren place, a grove reduced to timber, much as the 
enlightened figures of philosophy reduced God to the empirical realm of finitude. But now, insists 
the young Hegel, this grief must be transformed. The loss of finitude in the Absolute must be 
resituated in the totality or purity of the Absolute, not to rid us of the grief, but to “re-establish” that 
grief within an “absolute Passion”, or a “speculative Good Friday in place of the historic Good 
Friday”, where “the highest totality can and must achieve its resurrection solely from this harsh 
consciousness of loss, encompassing everything…”.29  
Altizer throughout his writings saw this Good Friday as primary and foremost in the Easter 
celebration, and in the Eucharistic remembrance that follows from it. In a later letter written to 
friends on Good Friday itself (April 10, 2009), he commented: “Good Friday is our most solemn day 
of meditation, a meditation induced by a renewal of the death of God”. This is a sacrifice alien to all 
philosophical language, that is until Hegel – he who unfolds “the first philosophical realization of the 
death of God”, one as “a genuine philosophy of absolute kenosis, and our only one apart from 
                                                          
27 G. W. F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. and eds. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1977), p. 57. 
28 Ibid., p. 190. 
29 Ibid., p. 191. 
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Nietzsche, for it is Hegel and Nietzsche who most profoundly enact the death of God.” And hence, 
he adds, “Nietzsche and Hegel are our primal philosophers of Good Friday.”30 In their respective 
announcements of this Good Friday, the “death-day” of divinity,31 dysangelical good news, 
crucifixion and resurrection become one and the same, a celebration of coincidentia oppositorum 
that is most powerfully enacted for Altizer in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, whose celebration of death in 
the wake becomes a joy synonymous with the Yes-saying of Nietzsche’s call, so that if, Altizer writes, 
“Eternal Recurrence is fully and finally celebrated in the Wake, this is an eternal recurrence of that 
Easter which is Good Friday, or that crucifixion which is eternal resurrection.”32 This Nietzschean 
renewal and recreation comes to constitute the speculative nature of the young Hegel’s absolute 
Good Friday. 
If in his earlier texts Altizer emphasized the process of this recreation as it took form in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in the middle and later texts he emphasized the logic of this recreation as it 
took form in Hegel’s Science of Logic. If the concluding words of the Faith and Knowledge essay 
invoked a “speculative Good Friday”, and the concluding words of Phenomenology of Spirit invoked a 
“Calvary of Absolute Spirit”33, the concluding words of Science of Logic invoke an “absolute 
liberation”.34 Altizer was fully cognizant of these end points in Hegel, for to him they were as much, 
and crucially, beginning points. The speculative crucifixion leads to resurrection, Calvary to 
infinitude, absolute liberation to the totality of the Concept (Begriff) as wholly in-and-for-itself (an 
und für sich), the externality of Idea mediated into the “free Existence” of a pure, and purely self-
comprehending, Spirit as Geist. But what exactly does this an und für sich mean for Altizer? The 
liberation at the end of Hegel’s Greater Logic is not merely the culmination of a science 
(Wissenschaft). It is the culmination of a profound theology, at work by means of an eternal 
circularity.  
In Faith and Knowledge, the speculative Good Friday returns us to the opening of the text where 
over the corpse of an old Reason and Faith hovers a “new born peace”, one which dialectically is 
neither Reason nor Faith but rather a unifying “child of both”.35 So a speculative Good Friday, in its 
speculation upon “the whole truth and harshness of its God-forsakenness”, is neither logical 
                                                          
30 Altizer, “Letter 44: To Friends (April 10, 2009)”, in This Silence Must Now Speak, p. 156. 
31 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Apocalyptic Trinity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 161. 
32 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Call to Radical Theology, ed. Lissa McCullough (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2012), p. 130. 
33 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 493. 
34 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1969), p. 843. 
35 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 55. 
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reasoning nor illogical believing, but a new born peace between crucifixion and resurrection into 
which both “the dogmatic philosophies” and “the natural religions” “must vanish”.36 
In Phenomenology of Spirit, the Calvary of Absolute Spirit returns us to the opening Preface, where 
the True is possible only through a self-imposed negation of its otherness within, or, in language that 
distinctly anticipates Nietzsche, only through a “self-restoring sameness” of its internal diversity, 
described as “the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having 
its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual.”37 We might say 
with Nietzsche: only by being worked out to its end (as death) is it life. Significantly, for Altizer, in the 
words to immediately follow, Hegel recasts this process theologically: “Thus the life of God and 
divine cognition may well be spoken of as a disporting of Love with itself; but this idea sinks into 
mere edification [Nietzsche’s sense of moralism], and even insipidity [Nietzsche’s sense of “morality 
as vampirism” – “the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself”38], if it lacks the seriousness, the 
suffering, the patience and the labor of the negative.”39 
In Science of Logic, the absolute liberation returns us to the opening “With What Must the Science 
Begin?”, in which the question of beginning, of logic’s beginning and of beginning’s logic, must be 
liberated from presuppositions, so that the beginning might become absolute, mediated by nothing 
and with no ground, totally free.40 But to achieve this logically, so as to be led back to absolute 
knowledge in its innermost truth, this beginning must go to its end where it freely externalizes itself, 
“opening or unfolding itself into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the 
development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to 
its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle.” The essential 
requirement for this, Hegel concludes, “is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but 
rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the 
last is also the first.”41 This very biblical idea constitutes the end’s absolute liberation (from itself). 
Now let us see how Altizer, whose voice shares Hegel’s accent unmistakably, appropriates the dense 
ideas circulating here. Let us again draw upon Altizer’s comparison with Spinoza, as we did above in 
                                                          
36 Ibid., p. 191. 
37 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 10. 
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and 
ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), p. 790. 
39 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 10. 
40 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 70. 
41 Ibid., p. 71. 
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relation to Nietzsche’s actuality within the immanent world, this time from the earlier second 
chapter of The Genesis of God entitled “Hegel and the Christian God”:  
The question of the identity of God is perhaps the deepest question posed by 
Hegel's system, and that question is also the question of the presence or the 
absence in that system of the uniquely Christian God, and, more specifically, the 
question of the presence or absence therein of the Crucified God. Clearly, the 
question cannot even be asked of Spinoza, and even if Spinoza and Hegel alike 
deeply affirm the absolute love of God, just as each affirms the absolute 
providence of God, Spinoza's God can in no way be associated either with death 
or with evil. But Hegel's God is a God who from the beginning becomes alienated 
from itself, therein withdrawing into itself and becoming “self-centered”; and this 
“evil existence” is not in itself alien to God, but rather essential to the very 
identity of God as God. (Phenomenology of Spirit: 780)42  
With this understanding of self-alienation within the Godhead, Altizer can now go on to redirect the 
Phenomenology through the Science of Logic:  
This is that purely negative movement of God which realizes that God who is 
"being-in-itself," a negative movement which is absolutely necessary to make 
possible the death of God. And that is the death which reconciles absolute 
essence with itself, a reconciliation which is the death of the purely alienated or 
the purely abstract God (Phenomenology of Spirit: 779). The conclusion of the 
Science of Logic knows that death as absolute liberation, a death which is the 
Calvary of absolute Spirit, and a Calvary apart from which God would only be that 
purely abstract Spirit which Hegel can discover in Hinduism and Spinoza alike.43  
This alienated or purely abstract Spirit allows us now to return finally to Altizer’s reading of 
Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence. For what is dying here at Golgotha is the wholly alienated or holy 
God of primordial Eternity, which Altizer says Hegel finds in Hinduism and, in his way, Spinoza. If we 
read backwards in The Genesis of God, back towards the beginning as genesis, as we have been 
reading backwards throughout this discussion, we go back to “The Logic of Genesis” that is Chapter 
                                                          
42 Altizer, Genesis of God, p. 38. An earlier version of this chapter was published as “Hegel and the Christian 
God”, in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Spring, 1991), pp. 71-91. 
43 Altizer, Genesis of God, p. 38. 
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1, and there find Altizer addressing directly Hegel’s circular logic/Logic that deals with both the 
death and liberation of Eternity.  
It was Hegel, Altizer claims, who most understood that the nullity of the Creator God who stands 
wholly apart from creation in a prior eternity is a nullity that itself needs to be annulled. To return 
back to this God of prior or primordial eternity is what is captured in Eternal Return. And it is this 
Eternal Return that needs now to be overturned. But how is it to be annulled? It was Hegel who best 
understood that it must, out of necessity, be annulled from within itself. To do so requires that 
negation, as the act of annulling, become an actualizing force, a Trieb, to use Hegel’s term he picked 
up especially from Schiller, and which Altizer places at the center of absolute spirit.44 This force first 
must act upon itself, to negate the nullity of primordial eternity and in that negation to actualize the 
nullity of an actual eternity. Eternal Return takes us back to a primordial nothing, whether in 
Christian, Buddhist or Hindu terms.45 As part of modernity’s forward-moving impetus, this return is 
now rendered impossible by the absolute, Hegel’s absolute negation, so as to engender an actual 
nothing. Only from this actual nothing can a new beginning arise. 
What, then, is the Hegelian circle? It cannot be an archaic or primordial circle of 
return, just as it cannot be a Buddhist circle of pure emptiness, and cannot be 
because it cannot return to an undifferentiated totality or emptiness. The truth is 
that the Hegelian circle is not an empty circle, not a circle which is empty of 
actuality, but rather a circle which is absolute actuality itself.46  
This absolute actuality is non-metaphysical and purely immanent for Altizer, which is why he can call 
Hegel an “atheist”, but “only by way of a unique Christian thinking”.47 It is towards this unique way 
of thinking that the Science of Logic moves, as it begins its own genesis with the actuality of a new 
beginning. And even if there is “no direct exposition of the ‘death of God’” as the Logic explicates its 
Wissenschaft, “every movement of this [the Logic’s] exposition is an abstract embodiment of that 
‘death’”, which does away with metaphysics and transcendence, and plunges us into a total 
                                                          
44 Ibid., p. 20. For a discussion on Hegel’s debt to Schiller in relation to the Trieb, see Andrew W. Hass, Hegel 
and the Art of Negation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014), pp. 27-28; 62-70. 
45 In this list Altizer also included Neoplatonism, or at least Plotinus’ version of Neoplatonic thought, the 
Oneness of which he felt constituted an absolute transcendence synonymous with a primordial Nothing. See 
Altizer, “Letter 27”, The Silence Must Now Speak, p. 109. This is arguable, and I have taken issue with Altizer on 
this point in subsequent correspondence. 
46 Altizer, Genesis of God, p. 20. 
47 Ibid., p. 19. 
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immanence. This plunge is Nietzschean, but taken from the starting point of an abstract absolute, 
rather than from that of the viscera of life. As Altizer writes:  
This is a purely abstract form of that total immanence that Nietzsche will enact in 
his proclamation of Eternal Recurrence, and even as that eternal recurrence is the 
very opposite of a primordial eternal return, and is so if only because of its 
celebration and exaltation of a present and actual moment, the Hegelian circle is 
the opposite of a primordial and Buddhist circle.48 
The Science of Logic is thus “a purely logical realization of genesis”, of beginning anew within a 
wholly consummate immanence, which is Nietzsche’s end.49 “Ecce Homo”, behold the man, the 
incarnated being there in the world. Thus the Logic’s liberation is a consummate Calvary, or an 
apocalypse, but one whose ending inaugurates a beginning, a newly immanent beginning, and one 
that, from Hegel, as he moves between the Phenomenology and the Greater Logic, begins again in 
Nietzsche, who himself was already beginning in Hegel. Thus we could say, as Altizer beholds both 
men, Nietzsche has his beginning and end in Hegel, Hegel his genesis and apocalypse in Nietzsche. 
 
Enacting the Unity of Nietzsche and Hegel 
If it was Altizer’s stated project to unify Hegel and Nietzsche, the foregoing examination reveals that 
the movement of that unity is fundamentally and irrevocably circular, where the beginning is 
actually end, the end actually beginning. Both Hegel and Nietzsche enact this circularity in their 
thought and writing: Hegel in the circularity within and between the Phenomenology and the Science 
of Logic,50 Nietzsche through his evolving idea of Eternal Recurrence that begins, most assuredly and 
dramatically, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The drama is crucial: the circularity must remain in self-
conscious motion, not as linear narrative, but as a Greek play, enacted again and again, first in the 
service of a Dionysian festival, and then, increasingly, in the service of a Eucharistic liturgy, the 
remembrance of, and the partaking in, a dysangelic euthanasia as a deep awakening to a new 
theological actuality, celebrated in the wake of Joyce. 
Altizer’s great legacy is not only to mark out this drama within these two crucial dramatis personae, 
Nietzsche and Hegel, but indeed to enact the drama between them. “Enactment” is a word 
                                                          
48 Ibid., p. 21. 
49 Ibid., p. 23. 
50 “While all serious Hegelians are aware of the integral relationship between the Phenomenology of Spirit and 
the Science of Logic, this relationship has only recently begun to be critically explicated…” – Altizer, “Letter 26”, 
This Silence Must Now Speak, p. 106. 
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frequently employed by Altizer. Its very frequency is self-fulfilling, for to repeat “enactment” is itself 
an enactment of recurrence. Anyone coming to Altizer’s work is immediately struck by that 
recurrence, and the less perspicuous reader will see this as deficiency, a mind stuck in a stale loop of 
sameness and repetition, betraying a lack either of imagination or of intellectual acumen, if not of 
both. To charge Altizer with such deficiency is to misunderstand profoundly the very intention of his 
theology – and it is, unashamedly, a theology from beginning to end – a theology both prophetic and 
liturgical. It is prophetic in its calling out with audacity and courage what modern theology has been 
so resistant to accept, that God is actually dead, annulled in an actualized and actualizing death, and 
it enjoins modern prophets from Blake to Nietzsche to Joyce in marking out both the nay-saying and 
yea-saying of this reality. And it is liturgical in its repetitive call of the coincidentia oppositorum 
between this No and Yes, a call that echoes in multiple but recurring voices of the artists, 
theologians and philosophers that make up Altizer’s canon. We might even go so far as to call this a 
prophetic liturgy, in the sense that the prophetic call must always be enacted, repeatedly, so that it 
does not revert to the Eternal Return of a primordial ground, but keeps itself newly alive in an 
Eternal Recurrence of an actual ground-breaking genesis. 
Both Nietzsche and Hegel break new ground in this respect, but they keep breaking ground in the 
very enactment of their thought. For Hegel this is done most emphatically in the Phenomenology, 
which in Geist’s movement towards its own self-consciousness performs the realization of the 
actualization of Nothing in the Absolute.51 For Nietzsche this is done most emphatically by 
Zarathustra, who rewrites the Gospel narratives in dysangelic terms (for “what could one create if 
gods existed?”52). Altizer breaks new ground by breaking the ground that traditionally separates 
Nietzsche from Hegel, and by enacting their respective enactments as an act of unity. This 
enactment requires the kind of liturgical recurrence in which the invocation of Hegel elides with that 
of Nietzsche, and if Hegel through negation could penetrate deeply into Eternal Return to unfold its 
own self-alienating and self-annulling logic, Nietzsche through destruction could penetrate deeply 
into Eternal Recurrence to generate a life-giving force and vitality. What Altizer ultimately enacts 
therefore is the negation of Eternal Return in Eternal Recurrence. And if this engenders an 
Aufhebung, it is one where, in the annulment of a primordial Eternity, a new born peace emerges 
                                                          
51 Altizer and I differ on the terminology here. I argue, in Hegel and the Art of Negation, that it is not the 
Nothing that is enacted but negation, since Nothing is the opposite pole to Something, whereas negation 
realizes and fulfills the Becoming that is in operation between these poles. Altizer’s sense of “actual”, as 
informed by Nietzsche, intends, I believe, to capture this Becoming, that is, to infect the Nothing with an actus 
purus by which “an absolute beginning or genesis is the beginning of an actual emptiness” (Altizer, Genesis of 
God, p. 21). 
52 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, “Upon the Blessed Isles”, in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 199. 
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between disappearance and beginning, as manifested in an actual Eternity forever beginning itself 
anew.  
The most explosively original enactment of this most circular ground of ground-breaking is for Altizer 
found neither in Nietzsche nor in Hegel, however. It is found, as we have already suggested, in the 
most circumlocutory of all novels, the Christian epic that is Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. For as Altizer 
never tired of pointing out – and on occasion enacted in a theatrical performance of reading53 – the 
ending leads directly back to the beginning, and “A way a lone a last a loved a long the” (concluding 
words of the novel) finds its completion in the opening “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve 
of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and 
Environs”.54 No mere literary sleight of hand, this movement for Altizer realizes the originating 
center – the Trieb, in Hegelian language – that drives the “unreadable” narrative55 forward in its 
totality. The “commodius vicus of recirculation” is, on one level, of course Dublin and its byways; but 
it is also, for Altizer, the encompassing totality of language itself, its universality in the literal sense of 
the word, which as an actus purus he dares to call “the speech of God”. As God falls into the world, 
as enacted on the first page of the novel, he falls into the actuality of language. But in the Wake this 
is a pure actuality of newness, with speech always under renewal, and in that process it yields a God 
always recurring again and again.  
But God again is God again, and God again in the linguistic chaos of the Wake, a 
chaos in which the apocalypse of God is the fall of God, and the fall of God into a 
fully and actually spoken speech. This speech is truly eternal recurrence, the 
eternal recurrence of condemnation and fall, and the enactment of that fall in the 
pure actuality of speech.56 
In this continually re-enacted fall, as an eternal Fall, the Creator becomes wholly identical 
with creation, and thus the passing that is “the wake of God” becomes “a wake which itself 
                                                          
53 For those of us lucky enough to witness such a performance, this was simultaneous delivery and deliverance, 
simultaneous creation and liberation, simultaneous prophetic announcement and liturgical rite, all enacted 
with a homiletic power that, if bemusing and bewildering to a by-passer, deeply moved the room in which it 
was performed.  
54 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 628-p. 3. 
55 “…if this work is the fullest realization of our unconscious which has ever occurred in any work, its dreamers 
are vibrantly awake, and most awake in the pure immediacy of their language, a language calling forth not only 
a universal humanity, but a humanity that is overwhelming in its language, and hence pure language is pure 
act. But it is only so when we can least understand it, only when it is most distant from all understanding and 
all actual comprehension. Hence the necessity of this radically new language…” – Altizer, Living the Death of 
God, p. 128. 
56 Altizer, “The Epic Voyage into Apocalypse”, in Call to Radical Theology, p. 129. 
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is resurrection”, as actuality overcomes primordiality.57 If Hegel traced the philosophical 
lineaments of this re-enacted Fall as “a feeling that God himself is dead”, from which a 
speculative Good Friday becomes a Calvary of Absolute Spirit, Nietzsche embodied the 
“wake of God” through Eternal Recurrence. Neither Hegel nor Nietzsche, in all their 
obsession with speech and language, would have understood Finnegans Wake. But for 
Altizer, Hegel’s radical logic and Nietzsche’s radical life find ultimate enactment in a radical 
wake by which the negation of consciousness in death is met by the wakefulness of 
consciousness in life. No is best articulated by a Yes, and if there is any pure Yes available to 
us, it is found in the over-abundance of Finnegans Wake that remains unavailable to our 
comprehension yet wholly available when “we truly hear it, and hear it above all as 
enactment”, the enactment of an ecstatic Yes.58  
For those who dare to have ears to hear this Yes, Altizer enacts this enactment over and 
over again. If he himself has an actus purus of this Yes, it is in the book devoted most 
directly and most pronouncedly to speech, The Self-Embodiment of God (1977). He himself 
knew this to be “his best book”, but precisely because it came from elsewhere, he says, as if 
in a revelation.59 What it reveals is the drive for a new theological language, in which the 
actuality of speech, through a mode more meditative than discursive (“Eastern and 
Western at once”60), finds its originating source in silence.  
The book begins with a question: “What is speech?” It ends in a final act of locution, 
requiring double quotation marks: “‘It is finished.’” In the middle, as it passes through 
thematic biblical movements familiar in kind – Genesis, Exodus, Judgment, Incarnation, 
Apocalypse: a five-act drama – it enjoins the becoming speech of silence. What is silenced 
upon a first pass of reading is what is never not present in all his other writings: the familiar 
names and texts of those Western writers who form Altizer’s liturgica dramatis, from 
Augustine to Joyce. Not even the Bible is named, even though Altizer tells us he set out to 
write a full biblical theology.61 In this conspicuous absence then is a text in which Nietzsche 
and Hegel are consciously made mute. And yet they resound on every page, heard in the 
inexorable coincidence of speech and silence, the one the pregnation of the other. What is 
heard upon a second pass is thus the fecund negation that is both Hegel and Nietzsche at 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Altizer, Living the Death of God, p. 128. 
59 Ibid., p. 30. 
60 Ibid., p. 31. 
61 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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once, a negation giving birth to an actuality that is prolix, even if what is prolix in that 
actuality is its own otherness. “Only the act of speech can actualize silence, but when 
speech is fully and finally enacted in silence, silence is thereby actualized, and so actualized 
that it can never again be only silence.”62 
Thus Hegel and Nietzsche are heard in repeated passes of this extraordinary text as the very 
circularity of the passing, as what has passed and what comes to pass, and what passes 
over from speech to silence in a coming together. “It is finished” is the text’s final 
utterance. This declamation of an end, as an ending, returns us to the opening as an 
interrogative: “What is speech?” In Altizer, what is born in this question is the beginning of 
actuality, but an actuality that only finds itself in finality: “A beginning? Yes, a beginning 
because it is an ending, an actual ending of its real opposite, and thus an actual 
beginning.”63 To say “It is finished” it to begin anew the passage of God’s own embodiment. 
Tellingly, the words “death” and “dead” are not to be found anywhere in this text. Only 
words like “negation”, “self-emptying”, “silence”, and “finality”, the finality that is spoken in 
“It is finished”. But to speak these words is to re-embody the God of Calvary. “The real 
ending of speech is the dawning of resurrection, and the final ending of speech is the 
dawning of a totally present actuality.”64  
In this dawning we cannot but hear Nietzsche; in this beginning Hegel. In the totally present 
they come together as an affirming unison of Yes. And if in their unity they should hear 
Altizer speak, it is to hear the words that Joyce himself might have said: “No, in truth, it is 
never finished.” 
                                                          
62 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Self-embodiment of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 94. 
63 Ibid., p. 18. 
64 Ibid., p. 96.  
